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by the probative value of the evidence so withheld. Since a trial should
be an orderly search for truth in aid of administration of justice rather
than a battle of wits between counsel, surprise tactics and unfair
manipulation of evidence should be guarded against.
Though a general reading of Nebraska cases might seem to in-
dicate uncertainty as to the nature of admissible rebuttal evidence, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska has followed certain standards. Mc-
Cleneghan v. Reid,2 decided in 1892, is the basis of broad discretionary
power on the part of the trial court. The court there decided that
"The order in which proof is introduced is largely within the dis-
cretion of the trial court, and, unless a party has thereby been deprived
of a substantial right, or there has been an abuse of discretion, it is not
subject to review." For example, it has been held where the plaintiff
was seeking to replevy goods allegedly seized improperly on execution
by the defendant sheriff, that the failure by the plaintiff to show title
to the goods in his case in chief could not be corrected upon rebuttal.3
Refusal to admit such evidence was within the discretion of the trial
court. However, when the trial court admits rebuttal evidence which
was withheld for clearly unjustified reasons, the trial court has abused
its discretion.4 Harmless error will not justify reversal, but where
material evidence is withheld without justification and the dramatic
or surprise effect of such evidence might have influenced the decision
reached by the jury, prejudice will be assumed.
What constitutes a justified reason for withholding evidence until
rebuttal presents a problem. Generally the plaintiff need not antici-
pate affirmative defenses and may rightfully reserve any answer to
them until rebuttal.5 In fact, even where the plaintiff in his case in
chief has failed to make out a prima facie case, if the defendant fails
to take advantage of the defect and goes on to present an affirmative
defense, the plaintiff may then rebut such affirmative defense.6
Where rebuttal is directed at evidence toward which an objection
of incompetency would have been sustained if made, such rebuttal is
proper. However, the court has ruled that ".... the admission of im-
proper evidence on one side furnishes no warrant to the other to
meet it by that which is equally bad."7 Hence, the plaintiff cannot
rebut hearsay evidence through the admission of further hearsay.8
2 34 Neb. 472, 51 N.W. 1037 (1892).
Mutz v. Sanderson, 94 Neb. 293, 143 N.W. 302 (1913).
'McClellan v. Hein, 56 Neb. 600, 77 N.W. 120 (1898).
City of McCook v. Adams, 76 Neb. 1, 114 N.W. 496 (1906).
Crockett v. Miller, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 292, 96 N.W. 491 (1902). However, see
Seiber v. Weiden, 17 Neb. 582, 24 N.W. 215 (1885) saying that the plaintiff has
no absolute right to rebut in his case in chief a defense which he anticipates
the defendant will raise.
'McCartny v. Territory, 1 Neb. 121 (1871).
* See note 6 supra.
NOTES
By statute, however, if the defendant introduces in evidence "...
part of an act, declaration, conversation or writing . . . ," the door is
thereby opened for the plaintiff to inquire into the whole conversation
or writing on the same subject.9
Cases involving cumulative evidence or evidence which merely
negatives a denial raised by the defendant present largely the same
problem.10 In McClellan v. Hein" the plaintiff, in an action for dam-
ages for loss of support attempted to prove that her husband had
purchased liquor in the defendant's tavern. The defendant introduced
evidence that the husband had not. In rebuttal the plaintiff sought to
bring in two more witnesses to testify concerning the same point.
The court concluded that although it was within the discretion of the
trial court to admit such cumulative evidence, failure to do so was not
error. Similarly in Watson v. Roode12 the court decided that where the
plaintiff brought action against the defendant for breach of warranty
that the defendant's stud horse was a "sure foal-getter," the defendant's
denial that a warranty had been given was but a negative defense. The
court affirmed the decision of the trial court saying that the plaintiff
was properly denied the right to introduce evidence in rebuttal for
the purpose of showing what the parties had meant by "foal-getter."
The rationale of these cases appears to be that there is no absolute
right to admit such evidence upon rebuttal. But on the other hand
should the court exercise its discretion and admit the evidence, that
admission by the court does not constitute reversible error unless the
plaintiff was clearly unwarranted in withholding the evidence and
the defendant has thereby been prejudiced.1 3 It should go almost
without saying that when the court does exercise its discretion and
allows rebuttal evidence to be admitted which might properly have
been declined, the defendant must be allowed an opportunity to reply
to such evidence.14
0 The most recent pronouncement on the scope of rebuttal in general
was laid down in Conley v. Hays,- decided in 1951. There the plaintiff
was seeking to recover a down payment on a contract for the purchase
of some sheep. The defendant introduced evidence to show the plain-
tiff's motive for repudiating the contract. The trial court admitted re-
buttal evidence by the plaintiff on that point. The Supreme Court
affirmed stating that ". . . the plaintiff may meet by rebuttal evidence
INeb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1215 (Reissue 1948).
"oKansas Manufacturing Co. v. Wagoner, 25 Neb. 439, 41 N.W. 287 (1889);
Hutchinson v. Western Bridge & Construction Co., 97 Neb. 439, 150 N.W. 193(1914); Jensen v. Omaha & C.B. Street Ry., 128 Neb. 21, 257 N.W. 257 (1934).1156 Neb. 600, 77 N.W. 120 (1898).
12 30 Neb. 264, 46 N.W. 491 (1890).
1 2Metcalfe v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 103 Neb. 431, 172 N.W. 246 (1919).Gandy v. Early, 30 Neb. 183, 46 N.W. 418 (1890).
153 Neb. 733, 45 N.W.2d 900 (1951).

